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Introduction 
People power and the Arab Revolutions 
Towards a new conceptual framework of democracy 
in the Middle East 
Benjamin Isakhan, Fethi Mansouri and Shahram Akbarzadeh 
From late 2010 a series of dramatic and unprecedented events swept 
across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It began in the quiet 
Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid> where a young street vendor set himself 
alight in response to the corruption and oppression that surrounded 
him. This desperate act of self-immolation resonated with a deeply 
disgruntled population and led to weeks of popular protests across 
the country. On 14 January 2011> the 23-year autocratic rule of 
President Ben Ali came to an end. These events led to several scat-
tered protests in other Arab states, most notably in Egypt where tens 
of thousands of protestors eventually took control of Tahrir Square in 
Cairo. A stand-off ensued between elements loyal to the government 
and the popular uprising. Although he remained obstinate that he 
would introduce reform and see out his term, by 11 February the 
Arab Revolutions had claimed their second dictator in President 
Hosni Mubarak. These events led to free and fair elections in Tunisia 
(23 October 2011) and Egypt (28 November 2011to3 January 2012)-
events international observers hailed as great successes. In both 
Tunisia and Egypt, Islamist parties claimed victory, amassing well over 
40 per cent of the vote-the Ennahda (Renaissance) party in Tunisia 
and the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt. 
Today, while there is certainly cause for optimism in Tunisia and 
Egypt, turning the ideals of the revolution into a reality is proving an 
enormous challenge as the process of political reform encounters the 
many intractable problems that have plagued the region for decades. 
It is also important to note that some of the Arab Revolutions 
have come at a very high price. Even in the successful examples of 
Tunisia and Egypt the toppling of tyrants was accompanied by a high 
body count. Elsewhere the cost has been much higher. In Libya the 
movement turned into a brutal civil war. While the 'rebels' controlled 
key Libyan towns, Colonel Gaddafi used his entire arsenal in an 
attempt to quash the resistance. With key regional and international 
institutions like the Arab League condemning such actions, the UN 
authorised the use of 'all necessary measures' to protect civilians in 
Libya. Gaddafi was eventually captured and killed on 20 October 
2011 in his birth place of Sirte, paving the way for the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) to declare the liberation of the entire 
country. 
Meanwhile, citizens across the region continued to stage 
(mostly) peaceful protests in their struggle against oppression and 
towards equality, human rights and democracy. In Algeria1 Morocco, 
Oman, Jordan, Kuwait and Iraq, these movements have been met 
with a mixture of brutal suppression and modest political and 
economic reforms designed to placate the citizens rather than 
commit to genuine change. But the lethal cocktail of violence and 
politicking has been inost potent in Syria and Yemen where President 
Al-Asad and President Saleh have responded to civil unrest with a 
series of swift and deadly miJitary manoeuvres carried out in cities 
and towns across the two countries. Some of the more troubling 
events have occurred in the econon1ically prosperous kingdoms of 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. In Bahrain the Youth Movement and the 
various Shia opposition groups were quashed when King Hamad 
Al-Khalifa used not only his mvn helicopters and tanks to attack the 
protestors, but called on the military of Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) to intervene under the u1nbrella of the Gulf 
Co-operation Council (GCC) defence agreement. For their pare the 
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Saudis have met their own protests with a series of multi billion dollar 
reforms coupled with live fire on open crowds, and have run an 
abhorrent ideological campaign which asserts that Islam and social 
protests are incompatible. 
This complex set of events pose a number of critical questions 
that need urgent and in-depth scholarly attention. This volurne will 
be the first of its kind to address the Arab Revolutions and the varying 
analyses, debates and discussions that they have stimulated. It seizes 
a unique opportunity to reflect on these seismic events, their causes 
and consequences, as well as on the core issues facing the region in 
the future. However, this volume aims to be much more than a 
collection of detailed thematic essays on the Arab Revolutions. The 
central arguments and the key contributions of this book are twofold. 
Firstly, the book aims to situate the Arab Revolutions within their 
broader contextual background, arguing that a unique set of histor-
ical events as well as local, regional and global dynamics have 
converged to provide the catalyst that triggered the recent revolts. 
Secondly, this book will attempt to situate the events within a new 
conceptual framework. The argun1ent here is that the Arab 
Revolutions pose a very specific challenge to conventional wisdmn 
concerning democracy and democratisation in the Middle East. 
The Contextual Background 
The story of Western interference in the MENA region goes back to 
the very earliest days of the colonial period, beginning with 
Portuguese ventures into North Africa in the fifteenth century. The 
ensuing centuries saw the establishment of trading posts, permanent 
settlements and then fully occupied territories controlled by 
European empires across the region. As the moribund Ottoman 
Empire waned in power from the eighteenth century, European 
influence grew across the region, particularly in North Africa and the 
Gulf. With the help of the Arab Revolt of 1916-18, the Ottoman Einpire 
finally fell at the end of World War I and Britain and France extended 
their dominion into the Levant and Syria-Mesopotamia, hastily 
designing nation states and installing or supporting pliant monarchs 
and govern1nents to rule on their behalf. 
This period of colonial control was deeply unpopular and, in the 
aftermath of World War II, the MENA region saw a wave of 
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independence movements that sought to end European influence, 
leading to the emergence of two distinct postcolonial types of Arab 
regimes. The first included those in which independence was not 
accompanied by a movement seeking to oust the existing elites. 
Within this category, monarchies or governments that had been 
designed and propped up by Europe remained intact after formal 
independence. Some of these regimes remain to this day, including, 
for example, those of Jordan, Oman, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. In the 
second type of regime, calls for independence were accompanied by 
popular revolutions which also sought to usurp the governments put 
in place under colonialism. These popular upheavals led to the 
creation of new, independent postcolonial regimes across most of 
the MENA region, including those in Tunisia and Egypt, which have 
endured until recently. Both Ben Ali and Mubarak had been part of 
this postcolonial movement and each inherited their Presidency 
from their mentors and comrades, whereas in Libya Gaddafi came to 
power as the heroic champion of Libyan independence in 1969. 
Elsewhere, independence ushered in a tumultuous period of inilitary 
coups and counter-coups that eventually saw strong centralised 
governments emerge in countries such as Iraq, Syria and Yen1en. 
Despite these divisions and setbacks and despite the differences 
between the two types of postcolonial states, the post-independence 
period saw some attempts at reform and modernisation built atop a 
platform of oil-fuelled economic prosperity, civic strength, and the 
early promises of Arab political ideologies such as pan-Arabism and 
Arab nationalism. 
However, the promises made to the Arab people by the cham-
pions of independence soon proved empty as the vast majority of 
political elites across the region became increasingly autocratic and 
entrenched. Personal liberties and freedoms were quashed, civil 
society, political opposition and media freedoms were curtailed or 
controlled by the state and, in the worst cases, coercion and oppres-
sion reached levels comparable to the most tyrannical of regimes. 
Power and wealth were concentrated in the hands of an elite few 
while economies stagnated, unemployment skyrocketed and infra-
structure eroded. A sizeable and ever-widening economic gap 
emerged between the elite of the Arab world and the 'Arab streef. As 
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university graduates were left unemployed, living standards plum-
meted and the people became all too aware of the endemic nature of 
corruption in their societies, this reinforced the belief that the Arab 
system of governance was quickly losing legitimacy and credibility. 
People lost faith in their leaders and became increasingly critical of 
their government and its stranglehold over key institutions such as 
the military, the police, the media and the judiciary; they began to 
call for reform, freedom and justice and to more openly challenge the 
state. 
These localised dynamics were compounded by a set of regional 
issues which have routinely galvanised Arab public opinion. Foremost 
among these is the Israel-Palestine conflict which has for decades 
been a central political concern for many in the Arab world. The 
Israeli government's treatment of Palestinian Arabs and the failure of 
the Arab political elite to read and reflect public sentiment, to unite 
behind the cause and meaningfully engage the international commu-
nity on this issue, further exposed the weakness of the Arab regimes. 
Arab public opinion also rallied against the political elite of the region 
during the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, but especially with the 2003 
invasion and occupation. The 2003 war frustrated many Arabs, not 
only because it lacked international legitimacy or because of its unac-
ceptable human and economic cost, but also because of the 
ineffectiveness of Arab leaders to energise debate and adequately 
voice Arab sentiment on the global stage. Instead, some Arab states 
(Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia) went so far as to allow the 
US to use their territories and facilities to coordinate their deadly 
intervention. 
Finally, globalisation and recent advances in communications 
technologies such as satellite television and the internet have brought 
the world into the living rooms of the MENA. The 1990s and 2000s 
saw the development of stations such as Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera as 
well as increasing access to the internet. These new media outlets 
allowed otherwise sensitive topics (whether culturally taboo or offi-
cially banned) to de discussed and debated in the public sphere. 
Suddenly, issues such as the role of religion in a modern state or 
women's position in society became part of popular political 
discourse. So too did political dissent: Arabs now had an effective 
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platform from which to question their leaders, expose corruption 
and nepotism, and to call for a more equitable and democratic 
future. As Marc Lynch put it: 
Rather than imposing a single, overwhelming consensus, 
the new satellite television stations, along with news-
papers, Internet sites, and many other sites of public 
communication, challenged Arabs to argue, to disagree, 
and to question the status quo. These public arguments, 
passionate in their invocation of an aggrieved Arab identity, 
sometimes oppressively conformist and sometimes bitterly 
divisive, sensationalist but liberating, defined a new kind of 
Arab public and new kind of Arab politics. 1 
Taken together this set of historical factors, as well as the key 
local, regional and global dynamics, served as a potent cocktail that 
exposed the increasingly ineffective Arab regimes and severely 
eroded their legitimacy. Indeed, the nature of the Arab state sy&tem 
itself, which had endured for almost half a century, was no longer 
sustainable and was beginning to show all the signs of decay and 
self-destruction that any outdated mode of governance displays in 
its final fleeting moments of power. Most Arab regimes became 
increasingly fragile and lacking in legitimacy while a media savvy 
and highly educated citizenry were hungry for change. 
Towards a New Conceptual Framework 
The failure of the MENA region to produce robust democracies led to 
a conceptual crisis as academics, journalists and policy makers 
struggled to assess and interpret the reasons why the region 
languished in autocratic and ineffective models of governance. A key 
assumption of the colonial period was that the entire non-European 
world and the Arab people in particular were simply incapable of 
democracy. It was thought that while Europeans possessed a unique 
culture of civility and tolerance that was critical for democracy to 
flourish, the Afro-Asiatic world was trapped in an inviolable web of 
cultural stagnation and barbarity that was conducive only to 
'Oriental despotism'. If democracy was ever going to flourish in the 
MENA, it would only happen at the hands of Europeans who had 
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been given the responsibility to civilise th.e rest of the world-by 
occupation, by enslavement and by brute force if necessary. In his 
stinging critique of such Orientalism, Edward Said revealed that in 
Europe such notions had in fact been distilled down fron1 'essential 
ideas about the Orient- its sensuality, its tendency to despotism, its 
aberrant mentality, its habits of inaccuracy, its backwardness-into a 
separate and unchallenged coherence'. 2 Said's critique certainly had a 
dran1a1ic effect on Western studies of the MENA, forcing many 
analysts to re-assess the prejudices and assumptions implicit (and 
sometimes explicit) in inuch of the work on the region. However, 
Said's work did not provide an appropriate alternative framework 
through which to interpret and understand the failures and prospects 
for democracy in the region. 
The need for an appropriate alternative framework has been 
addressed in quantitative research by political scientists, econmnists 
and social scientists from the middle of the twentieth century. They 
sought to capture in fonnulas and numbers the degree to which one 
country or another was democratic and the prospects of them 
becon1ing even more so. This led to a flurry of scholarly research that 
asserted five key preconditions for democracy. First among these was 
economic development, with scholars such as Anthony Downs and 
Seymour Martin Lipset asserting a strong correlation between 
economic prosperity and democracy. 3 As Lipset famously 
hypothesised, 1the 1nore well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances 
that it will sustain democracy'. 4 The central premise here was that 
with economic prosperity would come higher degrees of literacy, 
education and urban residence, all of which would encourage 
support for, and participation in, democratic institutions. Building on 
the economic factors was the second key precondition of democracy, 
that of requisite social structures. It was thought that wealth would 
also generate a healthy and nonviolent sense of competition among 
various stakeholders. Autonomous social classes, regional groups, 
labour unions and ethnic and religious minorities would collectively 
create a sense of civil society or cmnmunal pluralism that would limit 
state control and curtail the centralisation of power.5 As Barrington 
Moore so succinctly put it, 'No bourgeois, no democracy'. 0 
To create this sense of c01n1nunal pluralism, democracy's third 
precondition was the need for a certain civic culture. In other words, 
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citizens needed to hold in common certain values and beliefs about 
politics and were required to have a high degree of mutual trust, 
tolerance for opposing views, a capacity for empathy, and a willingness 
to participate and compromise. This led to assertions that some 
cultures (notably Anglo-Saxon Protestantism) were more conducive to 
the emergence of democracy than others7• Beyond such civic culture, 
aspiring democracies also needed to meet a fourth precondition: a 
functioning state ruled by elites who have at least a nominal interest 
and commitment to move towards democracy. The state itself must be 
sovereign, be governed by the rule of law and derive its legitimacy 
from and extend its influence over its entire territory (that is not just 
among the elite and wealthy of the capital). Democratic transitions 
were thought to be most successful when strong political institutions 
were developed before popular political participation was increased8 
and a failure to do so would turn any transition towards democracy 
into a bloodbath. 9 In terms of the elites, they needed to make political 
pacts among themselves for the duration of the political transition 
and restrict mass participation until democracy had emerged. 10 In this 
context, the people's commitment to democracy is not as important 
as the efforts of the political elite who must be determined to see 
democracy grow and spread.11 
The fifth and final precondition that many saw as necessary for 
democracy to flourish was the role of external influences. Such 
scholars argued that the bulk of democracies that had sprung up 
throughout the twentieth century had done so under 'Western' 
tutelage. As Samuel P Huntington put it, in recent centuries the 
spread of 'democratic institutions could be ascribed in large part to 
British and American influence, either through settlement, colonial 
rule, defeat in war, or fairly direct imposition' 12 • The argument was 
built on the earlier colonial era literature which asserted that the 
West had a unique proclivity for democracy and an obligation to 
spread it across the world. Indeed, most of the literature which 
asserts key preconditions for den1ocracy follows this profoundly 
Eurocentric logic. For scholars such as Lipset, Moore, Almond and 
Verba, democracy had flourished in the Euro-American 'West' (and 
not elsewhere) because it was home to a uniquely 'interrelated 
cluster of economic development, Protestantism, [declining] 
monarchy, gradual political change, legitimacy'. 13 
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The foremost proponent of this line of thought was Huntington 
himself, who used these preconditions of democracy to argue that 
each region of the globe has its own unique religio-cultural essence 
that plays a large part in determining receptivity to democratic 
systems. 14 In his later work, Huntington isolated two such religio-
cultural examples, namely Islam and Confucianism, and labelled 
them 'profoundly anti-democratic', claiming that they would 'impede 
the spread of democratic norms in society, deny legitimacy to 
democratic institutions, and thus greatly complicate if not prevent 
the emergence and effectiveness of those institutions'. 13 Huntington 
also claimed that the twenty-first century would be marred by a Clash 
of Civilizations-a physical and ideological battle between these anti-
democratic forces and the West. 16 
Unfortunately, with the tragic events of 9I11 and the subsequent 
US-led military interventions and occupations in Afghanistan (2001-
) and Iraq (2003-2011), n1any pundits and politicians dusted off 
copies of The Clash of Civilizations to couch their responses to these 
events within a false binary comprising the forces of democracy and 
those that allegedly threatened its pre-eminence, mainly the Islamo-
fascists of the MENA region. To counter these threats, the invasion of 
both Afghanistan and Iraq were followed by ambitious and as yet 
inconclusive projects that sought to implant obedient models of 
democracy as part of the Bush administration's broader and very 
aggressive democracy promotion agenda. This same agenda saw the 
world's last remaining superpower put unprecedented pressure on 
allies and enemies across the world to become more democratic. 
This led to a sudden flurry of democratic activity across the 
MENA. For example, in 2005 alone, the region witnessed an 
extraordinary sequence of democratic developments. These included 
a successful series of public demonstrations in Lebanon (the 'Cedar 
Revolution') following the assassination of former Prime Minister 
RafikHariri, which saw the ousting of Syrian troops and, subsequently, 
the first free election in many years. In Egypt the 2005 election saw 
President Hosni Mubarak call on parliament to amend the 
constitution so that he could be challenged for the leadership in the 
nation's first multi-candidate popular vote. Saudi Arabia held 
municipal elections, the first of any kind in that nation for decades 
and the Palestinian territories held its first ever election, leading to 
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the ascension of the Islamist Hamas party to power in early 2006. In 
Iraq a series of free and fair elections and a referendum brought a 
constitution, an active and critical media landscape and a 
democratically elected governrnent, albeit under the auspices of US 
occupation.17 
However, as the Bush administration's vision of democracy 
became increasingly exposed for all its deficiencies and 
contradictions; as people watched the failures of democracy to meet 
the needs of the average Afghani or Iraqi; and as the tragedies of 
ethno-religious sectarian violence unfolded, the brief period of 
democratic openings slowed and then reversed. Many of the gains of 
the early to mid-2000s proved to be remarkably shallow: revolutions 
were followed by the rise of new elites with a thirst for power similar 
to the previous regime's, electoral openings and media freedoms 
were gradually quashed, hard won reforms were overturned and 
recently written constitutions ignored. Not surprisingly, scholars 
began to develop new theoretical frameworks to explain these 
developn1ents. US democracy promotion was thought to have 
actually created several hybrid 'semi-authoritarian' regimes in the 
MENA (and elsewhere) that were able to utilise the n1echanisms and 
discourses of democracy to further tighten their grip on power. 18 In 
other words, the MENA regimes were thought to be utilising (and 
controlling) democratic mechanis1ns such as elections, media 
freedoms, political opposition and civil society as part of their 
strategy to retain power. Most recently, in his study of the Arab 
republics of Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Algeria, Stephen J King argues 
that economic liberalisation and cosnietic democratisation had in 
fact strengthened their govermnents' authoritarianism 1g. He asserts, 
along with several colleagues, that these regimes were increasingly 
dynamic and ever-savvy to new ways to leverage modest social, 
political and economic change against calls for genuine change. 
The Arab Revolutions and the Significance of People Power 
While one cannot blame scholars for not having predicted the Arab 
Revolutions-a series of events that took virtually all Middle East 
experts by surprise-the toppling of the Tunisian, Egyptian and 
Libyan regimes, as well as the mass social upheavals in Yemen, Syria 
and elsewhere point to the futility of many of the models developed 
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and employed by political scientists and others to explain the politics 
of the Arab world. Indeed, the Arab Revolutions, driven by a newly 
found sense of people power, debunked not only the myths and 
blatant cultural racisms of the colonial period, but also the very idea 
that democratic change can be measured and predicted by the kinds 
of key preconditions outlined above. In tern1s of economic prosperity, 
for example, according to the International Monetary Fund and its 
use of 2010 data to rank 183 nations by Gross Domestic Product, 
Purchasing Power Parity (GDP-PPP) per capita, the Arab Revolutions 
have affected not only those among the richest in the region (Kuwait 
is ranked 14th in the world, Bahrain 34th, Oman 35th, Saudi Arabia 
41st) but also some of the poorest (Jordan 107th, Syd a 113th, Morocco 
117th, Iraq 127th, Yemen 138th). Interestingly, those states in which 
the Arab Revolutions have led to the toppling of the former regime 
rank somewhere in the middle of these two extremes (Libya 64th, 
Tunisia 84th, Egypt l 04th). 20 This directly contradicts the assertion 
that econo1nic prosperity is a useful measure for predicting 
de1nocratic change. 
In terms of the suggested need for civil society, while some 
MENA governments-like Egypt and Tunisia-were better at fostering 
a sense of communal pluralism than others, states such as Libya, 
Syria and Saudi Arabia imposed heavy sentences on dissent and went 
to great lengths to outlaw any organised opposition. This crackdown 
on political pluralism also affected the civic culture of the MENA 
region: debate and disagreement, especially public challenges of the 
incumbent regiine, were generally discouraged for fear of 
repercussions. Another supposed precondition for democratic 
change-a functioning state ruled by elites who have an interest in 
democracy-is not relevant to the Arab Revolutions. In many cases, 
the state itself was increasingly exposed for its failings and 
inadequacies, with its legitimacy not extending beyond a tight circle 
of cronies ensconced in the capital, and an incumbent elite 
uninterested in genuine democratic reforn1. 
Finally, in terms of external influences, while the MENA was 
occupied during the colonial period and has certainly seen its fair 
share of US influence and interference, particularly since the end of 
World War II, the Arab Revolutions may be understood to have 
happened despite, not because of, Western influence. For most of the 
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twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the West has designed, 
installed and supported (both overtly and covertly) a series of very 
undemocratic regimes in the MENA region. They have done so for 
several key reasons: because such regimes would be reliant on 
colonial support to stay in power; because the West wanted to secure 
precious resources like oil; because these regimes more or less agreed 
not to confront US policy in the region, particularly on the Israel-
Palestine conflict; and because they would serve as a bulwark against 
the threat of ideological enemies such as communism and socialism 
during the Cold War and militant Islam since the Iranian Revolution 
of 1979, and especially since 9 /11. Indeed, one of the key failures of 
the Bush administration's democracy promotion agenda was that it 
exposed the gap between US rhetoric and action on the issue of 
democracy as the US spoke the language of human rights and 
equality while maintaining strong bilateral relations with some of the 
least democratic countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia. In this 
way, the Arab Revolutions can be seen to contradict the five proposed 
key preconditions for de1nocratic change in terms of economic, 
social, cultural, political and external factors. 
The Arab Revolutions also contradict the deep-seated and long-
held claim that Islan1-its core teachings and philosophies, its 
cultural practices and its history-are anathema to democracy. While 
the revolutions were not strictly Islamist in tone (in the way that 
Iran's 1979 Revolution was) the overwhelming majority of 
participants have been Muslims. They appear to see no contradiction 
between their religion and the call for a more democratic order. 
While some have argued that the largely secular and liberal impetus 
of the Arab Revolutions has been 'hijacked' by Islamist political 
movements such as the powerful Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and 
Ennahda in Tunisia, such criticisms are couched within a Western 
prejudice that defines Islamist politics as inherently anti-
democratic. 21 Instead, the fact that Islamist parties have e1nerged as a 
credible force in the post-Arab Revolutions MENA demonstrates the 
fact that the will of the majority is driving politics much more so than 
under former regilnes. If Huntington's assertion that Islam is 
'profoundly anti-democratic' were ever true, he forgot to tell the 
millions of Muslims who took part in the Arab Revolutions and the 
Islamist parties who have competed in free and fair elections since. 
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Finally, the Arab Revolutions also bring into question the strength of 
research which has asserted that the MENA is home to new hybrid 
forms of authoritarianism. The leaders of the region are not nearly as 
good at using modest reforms to placate calls for change as was 
previously assumed. In most cases, rather than tightening their grip 
on power, the MENA regimes have either had power wrenched from 
them by the people, or are having to significantly loosen their 
stranglehold on it. 
Thus the Arab Revolutions have themselves demanded that a 
new conceptual framework be developed which appropriately 
conceives of democracy and democratisation in the post-
revolutionary MENA. The revolutions themselves give us insight into 
what this model might look like. Indeed, recent events are to be 
admired for the extent to which divergent voices have been heard, 
legitimate grievances have been aired, and women and minorities 
have been involved. They are also to be admired because a balance 
has often been struck between the pragmatic and the ideal, between 
the secular and the religious, between the desire not just to oust 
failing tyrants but to replace them with something new, something 
that could respond to the varying needs of the citizens. This new 
conceptual framework must therefore be free from Western 
prejudices, be dynamic and responsive to the needs of the people, 
relevant to the cultural norms and in tune with the rich history of the 
MENA region. As the contributors to this book argue, democratisation 
and political reforms can only endure and engender positive 
outcomes if they are developed organically from the bottom up, free 
of external and ideological agendas. This is the basis from which 
legitimacy and endurance can be generated and why the outlook for 
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya seem to hold significant promise despite all 
the immediate challenges they are facing. 
Chapter Summaries 
This volume opens with an ambitious chapter from Larbi Sadiki in 
which he discusses the challenges that the Arab Revolutions pose to 
traditional Orientalist accounts of the MENA. He argues that for many 
observers, the presence of political authoritarianism had provided a 
guiding framework through which Middle Eastern politics could be 
understood. This same framework was also utilised by various 
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Western-backed democracy promotion initiatives who viewed the 
MENA as a passive laboratory for testing out theories on democracy 
and democratisation, with few tangible results. However, the events 
of the Arab Revolutions have put the lie to such Orientalisms and 
forced many to ask deep questions about the regions supposed 
hostility to the rules of democratic engagement. For Sadiki, this 
marks a watershed moment in the study of the MENA and a 
significant opportunity to reassess the region and its politics and to 
develop appropriate and alternative ways of engaging and 
understanding it beyond the Arab Spring. Unfortunately, however, 
Sadiki discovers that this challenge has not been met by many 
Western observers who have instead relied on outdated stereotypes 
in their coverage of the Arab Revolutions 
The follm.ving chapter, by Lamia Ben Youssef Zazyafoon, focuses 
on civil society actors and their part in the Arab Revolutions. 
Specifically, Youssef Zazyafoon investigates the role of youth and 
wmnen in pushing the revolutionary agenda and the implications of 
this facet of the Arab Revolutions. She argues that the search for 
authenticity in post-Ben Ali Tunisia is putting women's rights at risk. 
The growing assertiveness of Islamist groups and the euphoria of the 
revolution put the concept of secularism on trial as a Western-
imposed system. This presents Tunisia, and to son1e extent the rest of 
the Arab world, with a crisis of identity. Youssef Zazyafoon argues, 
however, that this crisis springs fr01n the false divide between 
secularists and Islamists, and Francophone and Arabophone 
Tunisians. She points to the importance of feminism in retaining its 
relevance and agency by engaging with other political forces. 
Women's struggle has become inseparable from the whole nation's 
fight for citizenship, and Iadh Ben Achour's Higher Political Refonn 
Commission plays a key role in advancing Tunisian women's agency. 
The following two chapters focus on the role of new 
technologies and social networking sites such as Facebook and 
Twitter in the Arab Revolutions. In his chapter, Mchala Nejet argues 
that, in the case of Tunisia, such cmnmunications technologies were 
critical in capturing and disseminating the regime's early and violent 
responses to the protests. This catapulted the movement into one of 
unprecedented civil unrest which ulthnately brought down the Ben 
Ali regime. While Nejet rightly notes that the revolution in Tunisia 
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somewhat ironically allowed for the revival of the old anti-colonial 
slogans centred on dignity and national self-determination, he also 
raises questions about the ways in which Tunisians, along with all 
Arabs, might reinvent a political language relevant to the struggle of 
the Arab street beyond postcolonialism and beyond state oppression. 
The discussion of the role of social media in the Arab Revolutions 
is extended by Halim Rane and Sumra Salem who invoke terms like 
'Facebook Revolutions' and 'Twitter Revolutions' to describe and 
analyse these momentous events. Using diffusion theory, Rane and 
Salem examine the role of social media and the extent to which they 
can be credited for the emergence and achievement of the protesters' 
goals. They argue that while social media played important 
facilitation roles in terms of inter and intra-group communication as 
well as infonnation dissemination, mainstream mass media are stilJ 
highly relevant to the process. However, the success or failure of the 
uprisings largely depends on domestic factors and broader 
geopolitical contexts. This chapter demonstrates that the use of social 
media in the Arab Revolutions has significant implications for 
diffusion theory in terms of contact and identity among the social 
moveinents involved. 
Following the thematic exan1ination of the Arab Revolutions, 
this collection turns to some revealing case studies that highlight the 
challenges ahead. Matthew Gray presents an insightful assessn1ent of 
the developments in Bahrain. The Gulf kingdom of Bahrain witnessed 
extensive turmoil, beginning with protests in mid-February 2011 that 
became increasingly large, and at times violent, and which only 
ended after the regime's repressive crackdown, backed by the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), in March 20] 1. The Bahraini regiine is 
using an awkward combination of co-optation and repression to try 
to reassert its authority and restore its legitimacy. Gray argues that 
multiple dynamics were responsible for the Bahraini uprising: Sunni-
Shia sectarianisn1 was ilnportant, but so too were rentier dynamics, 
Bahrain's neo-patrin1onial state capitalism, its complex autocratic 
structure and King Hamad's broken prmnises of reform. The chapter 
exa1nines the hnpact of the uprising not only on Bahrain's state-
society relationship and social dynamics, but also on the region as a 
result of GCC intervention in Bahrain. Given the Kingdom's 
in1portance as a Sunni bulwark and key US ally in the Gulf, the 
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regional implications are immense and hold important lessons for 
other rentier states in the Arab world. 
The Bahraini case study is followed by an examination of the 
explosive political deadlock in Syria. Minerva Nasser-Eddine argues 
that the Arab revolution is ironic in that it represents a popular 
uprising against leaders who were once revolutionaries themselves. 
These leaders were part of a generation who worked to expel 
colonialism and were critical to the initial pride, hope and optimism 
of the post-independence environment-an era of pride, hope and 
optimism. Today these leaders represent corruption, cronyism, 
autocracy and fear. Now that many of the barriers of fear have been 
broken in across the MENA, today's Arab citizens are embracing the 
winds of change and hoping that regime change will bring about real 
and enduring reforms. This chapter examines the potential domestic, 
regional and international consequences of a weakened and failed 
Assad regime. Already political tremors are being felt in neighbouring 
Lebanon with political tension increasing between the pro- and anti-
Syrian camps within the Lebanese political sphere. The response 
from the international community to Syria has been different from 
the earlier enthusiastic support for the Arab Revolutions. Nasser-
Eddine points to Israel's close proximity with Syria as a key factor in 
setting the tone of this response. 
The regional implications of the Arab Revolutions are difficult 
to predict but their significance is undeniable: the success of popular 
democratic uprisings for justice and accountability has been 
streamed into the living rooms of people far beyond the Arab world. 
Luca Anceschi argues that the crumbling of the authoritarian regimes 
of the Arab world is a cause for concern in both Moscow and Beijing. 
The political leaderships of the Russian Federation and the People}s 
Republic of China have paid close attention to the mechanisms of 
these popular revolts and have tried to pre-empt such events in their 
own country. They have adopted strikingly similar attitudes towards 
the events that have unfolded in the MENA and heightened their 
crackdown on democratic dissent. Their concern with power 
maintenance has also informed their voting behaviour in the UN in 
relation to Libya, where both Russia and China abstained from key 
resolutions in the lead-up to the intervention. 
16 Introduction 
Together these chapters provide a significant study of the Arab 
Revolutions. They include key contextual information regarding the 
causes of the various people's movements, detailed studies of a 
diverse range of civil society actors and their critical role in agitating 
for change, specific case studies which shed light on the intractable 
problems that confront the potential for political change in Bahrain 
and Syria, and a discussion of the implications of the Arab Revolutions 
for international relations and the global order. They also shift debate 
from outdated assertions of the MENA region's inability to embrace 
democracy to a new conceptual framework that seeks to engage and 
understand the region in a more nuanced and less prejudiced 
fashion. This volume demonstrates that democratisation is at its best 
when it is done in tune with local norms and customs and is free of 
foreign interference or totalising ideologies. Democracy is not the 
West's to give to the Middle East. It is a dynamic system of governance 
underpinned by virtues of justice, equality and liberty. And these are 
virtues that the people of the MENA region have proved to understand 
at least as well as anyone in the West. 
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